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ABSTRACT
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 revised the corporate AMT
and explicitly linked corporate taxation to financial
accounting "Book Income". Congress added the book
income adjustment to eliminate highly publicized
instances in which corporations with substantial book
income have not paid tax. Our results indicate that
abusive firms are likely to pay more taxes under the
new AMT but the potential impact of this new law on
financial reporting may overshadow its expected
revenue generation benefits.

Are Expectations of Paying the AMT Consistent
With Reduced Tax Burden?
Introduction
The 1986 Tax Reform Act contained a new alternative
minimum tax (AMT) for corporations that arose from a
perception on the part of taxpayers and policy makers that
some U.S. corporations do not pay their fair share of the
corporate tax burden. These "abusers" report high levels of
income for financial reporting purposes to their stockholders
but pay little, if any, income taxes to the federal
government. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this
new law, it is necessary to determine if firms that are
expected to pay the new tax are the same firms that incur a
smaller share of the corporate tax burden. If there is
inconsistency, then the social costs associated with the new
law may outweigh its expected benefits.
The AICPA and FASB expressed their opposition to the
book income adjustment item for two reasons. Although the
FASB has historically maintained a neutral position regarding
tax legislation, the board indicated its concern about the
likely effects of this new law on the quality of financial
reporting. 1 The AICPA indicated its concern with the
possible inequities that may arise from application of the
1 Letter to Senator Robert Packwood Chairman, Senate
Finance Committee May 6, 1986.
new law. 2 As corporations seek to rearrange their asset and
capital structures to avoid or reduce the effect of this new
law, they may exert greater pressure to alter GAAP for
reasons other than adequate representation of accounting
information.
Corporations will probably exert pressure on regulatory
agencies (such as the FASB) to modify financial reporting
methods such that they are more congruent with tax reporting
methods or utilize methods for financial reporting purposes
which are detrimental to adequate financial reporting. In
addition to its impact on financial reporting, the new AMT
may unfairly tax the economic profits of the firm. This
occurs because the new AMT lacks any provision that would
prevent a corporation from paying AMT on economic profit
which had been fully subject to regular tax. For example,
this result may occur if a significant expense is recognized
in one year under financial accounting rules but the
corresponding tax deduction is deferred until the next year.
In order to evaluate the new law, its benefits must be
compared with the potential social costs associated with the
factors outlined in the AICPA and FASB comments. Given
Congress's intent, this study addresses the following
question: Will the new AMT, with its book income adjustment,
Comments on Temporary and Proposed Regulations on the
Alternative Minimum Tax Book Income Adjustment. Submitted to
the Internal Revenue Service Oct, 2 1987.
impact firms that, on average, experience a smaller portion
of the corporate tax burden?
Lucke, Eisenach, and Dildine (LED) [1986] investigate
corporate attributes that increase the probability of paying
additional taxes under the new AMT by simulating prototype
firms in the retail, durable, non-durable manufacturing, and
air transportation industries. They identify these
industries because of balance sheet composition (i.e., more
or less depreciable assets, different asset types) . Their
results suggest various firm characteristics that increase
the probability of a firm paying additional tax under the new
law. They conclude that the set of firms that pay the new
AMT is much broader than Congress's original intent, but they
provide no information whether firms that will pay the new
tax are the same firms that have not carried a fair share of
the corporate tax burden.
Using actual corporate information from publicly
available financial statements and LED's firm
characteristics, we provide evidence regarding the extent to
which the new law should impact some of those firms perceived
as bearing a smaller share of the corporate tax burden. This
study contributes to our understanding of the impact of the
AMT on corporations in two ways. First, in discussing the
motivation for the AMT, the Joint Committee on Taxation
[reference] stated that " ... in order to achieve both a real
and apparent fairness, Congress concluded that there must be
a reasonable certainty , that whenever a company publicly
reports significant earnings, that company will pay some tax
for the year" (emphasis added) . Thus, Congress expects those
firms with a smaller share of the corporate tax burden to pay
the new AMT. Our study looks at the consistency between
firms expected to pay the tax and their tax burden. Second,
this study supplements LED's results using actual data for
firms in the economy. Since actual income tax data is not
available, simulation studies such as LED's study may provide
some initial insights regarding the effect of new policy
decisions. However, it is important to extend those initial
insights using publicly available financial data in order to
assess the actual consequences of the new policy.
Our results suggest that the new AMT will have only a
marginal effect in increasing the tax burden of corporate
abusers. This suggests that the decline in financial
reporting, which may result from the corporate reactions to
the new tax, may significantly exceed the expected revenue or
distributional benefits.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section two provides a description of our tax burden measure.
Section three includes a review of the LED study and outlines
their suggested characteristics of firms that will pay the
new AMT. Section four contains a description of our results
while the last section provides a summary and our
conclusions.
Tax Burden
The intent of Congress in developing the alternative
minimum tax was "to ensure that no taxpayer with substantial
economic income can avoid significant tax liability. .." [Joint
Committee on Taxation, p. 432]. The problem Congress tried
to address arose from the public's perception that many major
corporations did not bear their fair share of the corporate
tax burden. The Joint Committee [p. 433] noted that "The
ability of high-income taxpayers to pay little or no tax
undermines respect for the entire tax system. . . . Even to the
extent that these instances may reflect deferral, rather than
permanent avoidance, of corporate tax liability, Congress
concluded that they demonstrated a need for a change"
.
Through the new law, Congress attempted to increase the
effective tax rates of those firms deemed abusers (i.e., low
effective tax rates)
.
An estimate of the firm's tax burden is generally
measured by its effective tax rate. Computation of a firm's
effective tax rate requires a measure of taxes paid and a
measure of corporate income. Fullerton [1984] states, "Last
year's tax as a percentage of last year's income may be a
good summary of the burden or redirected income flow...".
Identification of firms with low effective tax rates could be
ideally accomplished using corporate tax returns.
Unfortunately, tax returns are proprietary information and
not readily available to the public. However, information in
a firm's reported financial statements may allow the firm's
effective tax rate to be estimated.
Previous research regarding effective tax rate measures
[Fullerton, 1982, 1984; Weiss ,1979; Stickney and McGee,
1978; Pechman, 1977] indicates a range of acceptable
definitions of effective tax rates. 3 As long as the selected
measure is not subject to a specific bias (i.e., other than
random error) , the measure should provide a reasonable
estimate of the firm's corporate tax burden. Zimmerman
[1983] uses COMPUSTAT financial statement information to
calculate an overall effective tax rate for sample firms from
1941 to 1981. Zimmerman's measure is computed as:
ETR = Income Taxes/Operating Cashflows*
In defending his choice, Zimmerman states,
"the magnitudes, time trends and cross-sectional
differences in tax rates are comparable using IRS and
COMPUSTAT data. This suggests that financial statement
data yield unbiased estimates of effective tax rates."
We use Zimmerman's measure in this study and calculate it for
our sample firms using 1986 COMPUSTAT data. Our focus on
1986 annual corporate financial statements is motivated by
We do not propose a new measure, nor do we suggest a
solution to previous differences regarding the propriety of
these different measures. However, we do suggest that,
barring the analysis of tax return information, all effective
tax rates measure the firm's true effective tax rate with
some degree of error.
* This measure is calculated using COMPUSTAT data items
16, 35, 12 and 41. For a complete explanation see Zimmerman
[1983] p. 123 footnote 7.
two reasons: (1) many 1987 financial reports for sample firms
are not currently available, and (2) 1987 financial reports
would represent accounting income after firms may have
attempted to minimize the book income adjustment. Thus, the
1987 reports would not adequately portray the existing tax
distribution prior to corporate reactions to the new tax.
All non-regulated industry firms on the COMPUSTAT data
base are searched to determine those for which the requisite
data needed for this study are available. Firms with
negative operating income are excluded from our sample. This
search results in an initial sample of 952 firms. A
subsample of 720 firms in LED's industries is developed by
eliminating firms that are not in LED's four general industry
groupings. Summary statistics regarding the effective tax
rates for the total sample of 952 and the subsample of 720
are presented in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1
Suggested Attributes of Firms paying the New AMT
Lucke, Eisenbach, and Dildine [1986] determine that
firms paying the new AMT will have the following
characteristics
:
1. Higher Debt
2. Higher Growth
3. Lower Profit
LED suggest the following reasons for linking payment of the
AMT to these firm characteristics. Firms with higher debt
will be more likely to pay the AMT because larger interest
payments reduce taxable income and as a result the book
income adjustment will tend to be greater in proportion to
taxable income. Firms that are growing are more likely to
pay the AMT because of the large depreciation preference
generated. Less profitable firms will be more likely to pay
because taxes on taxable income will not increase as fast as
taxes under the AMT even though regular tax rates are higher,
Profitable firms will be less likely to pay taxes under the
AMT because the regular tax will increase faster as taxable
income increases.
For this study , the debt to equity ratio, computed as
total debt divided by total stockholders' equity, is used to
measure the debt characteristic. The financial statement
item chosen to represent profitability in our analysis is
income before taxes. Growth is measured by the average
change in sales over the ten years prior to 1986.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.
INSERT TABLE 2
Model and Analysis
LED identify four industries that, based on asset
composition are most likely or least likely to pay the new
8
AMT; they are, in order of least to most likely, retail,
durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing, and air
transportation. A test of the consistency between likelihood
of payment and the distribution of abusive firms is a
regression of effective tax rates on indicator variables for
the industries in the original sample of 952 firms. We
estimate the following model:
ETRi - a + j^Mi + (3 2AT t + (3 3Rt + e A
Where:
ETR t = 1986 Effective Tax Rate,
Mi = 1 if the firm is a durable or non-durable
manufacturer and otherwise,
AT
t
= 1 if the firm is in air transportation and
otherwise,
R t = 1 if the firms ia a retailer and otherwise,
e t = error term.
A significant negative coefficient for an industry indicator
would suggest a concentration of firms with lower effective
tax rates (i.e., smaller share of the corporate tax burden)
and a potential shift in the tax burden across industries.
For example, a significant negative coefficient for the air
transportation group is negative and significant, suggests
that these firms are abusers and, given LED's suggested
impact, would pay a greater share of the tax burden under the
new law. Consequently, the AMT could be considered an
effective tool in shifting the tax burden to abusive firms.
The results of this regression are provided in Table 3.
INSERT TABLE 3
All of the estimated regression coefficients for the industry
indicators are negative, indicating a high concentration of
firms with low effective tax rates in LED's industries
relative to other industries in the sample. However, the
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant and
the model explains none of the variation in effective tax
rates across the total sample. This suggests that the
distribution of paying firms is inconsistent with the
distribution of likely abusers. Thus, LED's claim that the
AMT may impact firms not considered abusive is supported. 5
5 An alternative is to group LED's general industry
classifications against all other industries, and test for
concentrations of low tax burden firms. We combined the
industry indicators so as to split the sample into the 720
firms in the industries pointed out by LED and the other 232
firms. The computed effective tax rate is regressed on this
indicator in the following model:
ETRi = a + flili + e A
Where:
ETRi = 1986 Effective Tax Rate,
Ij = 1 if the firm is in one of LED's
industries and zero otherwise,
e
t
= error term.
Consistent with the previous results, the coefficient for
industry group is negative but insignificant. Thus, the
distribution of abusive firms does not appear to be industry
specific.
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To test LED's suggested relationship between firm
characteristics and the payment of additional taxes under the
AMT, we regress the computed effective tax rate on the debt,
growth, and profit variables. 6 If the AMT is an effective
means of taxing abusive firms, the factors that determine
whether a firm will pay additional taxes should be inversely
related to the firm's effective tax rate (tax burden). For
example, firms with high debt, high growth, and low profit,
according to LED, are highly likely to pay the new tax. If
the AMT is effective, these firms should, on average, have
the lowest effective tax rates. The coefficient estimates
and their reported t-values are provided in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4
The regression coefficients for each of the variables are
significant and in the hypothesized direction. Consequently,
at least some of the firms who pay a smaller share of the
corporate tax burden will pay more under the new AMT.
However, the low explanatory power of the model indicates
that the shift in the tax burden may be very small. 7
Zimmerman suggests [1983] deleting observations in
which the effective tax rate exceeds 200%. This results in
the deletion of one firm and a sample size of 719.
The higher the R2 for this model, the more likely that
a firm paying more taxes is also a firm that has incurred a
smaller share of the corporate tax burden.
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One problem with the interpretation of the regression
results is the significant skewness and kurtosis in the
distribution of the error terms. Significant violations of
the normality assumption of the error terms for Ordinary
Least Squares may bias the significance of the t-tests that
the estimated model coefficients are not zero. We examined
this potential bias by bootstrapping (see Efron [1982]) the
coefficients 1000 times and obtaining distributions for each
of the estimated coefficients. An analysis of these
distributions indicates adjusted t-values for the
coefficients of -6.56 for debt, -2.21 for growth, and 3.95
for profit.
Our evidence supports the notion that (1) firms with
higher debt have lower effective tax rates, (2) firms with
higher growth have lower effective tax rates, and (3) firms
with higher profits have higher effective tax rates.
However, the low explanatory power of the model suggests that
the incremental social costs suggested by the AICPA and FASB
may be greater than the expected benefits from shifts in the
corporate tax burden.
Summary
This paper reports the results of an empirical analysis
intended to determine if the new Alternative Minimum Tax will
have an impact on corporations which incur a smaller share of
the corporate tax burden (Congress's description of a "tax
abuser"). We compute a measure of a firm's tax burden from
12
corporate financial statement information. Industry
classification and firm characteristics regarding the level
of debt, growth, and profitability, suggested by Lucke,
Eisenbach, and Dildine [1986], are used to analyze the
consistency between payment of additional taxes and the
firm's tax burden (i.e., the relationship between firm
characteristics and effective tax rates)
.
Our results provide several insights regarding tax
abusive firms and the factors stimulating payment of the new
AMT. First, abusive firms do not appear to be concentrated
in any general industry classification. 8 Second, our results
partially support LED's work; the regression coefficients for
the firm attributes are statistically significant and the
sign of the relationships indicate that if LED's analysis is
valid, firms with lower effective tax rates will pay more
taxes under the AMT. However, because the relationship is
relatively weak, we question the benefits of the AMT as an
effective tool for shifting the corporate tax burden when one
considers simultaneously the potential social costs.
Whether any concentration can be found with a finer
partition may be the subject of additional inquiry.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for the Corporations'
Effective Tax Rates
Total Sample
mean .085
minimum - 1.140
LED Industries
mean .084
minimum - .873
Firms in Other Industries
mean .091
minimum - 1.14
952 firms
standard deviation .169
maximum
720 firms
3.456
standard deviation .165
maximum
232 firms
3.456
standard deviation .181
maximum .964
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics for the Corporations'
Characteristics
Total Sample
Debt
952 firms
mean .471 standard deviation .184
minimum .035 maximum
Profit
(millions)
1.889
mean 167.1 standard deviation 561.6
minimum -2200.0 maximum
Growth
(millions)
8805.0
mean 119.3 standard deviation 305.7
minimum - 416.9 maximum 3494.6
LED Industries
Debt
720 firms
mean .463 standard deviation .176
minimum .035 maximum 1.889
mean 174.2
minimum -2200.0
Profit
(millions)
standard deviation
maximum
605.4
8805.0
mean 123.8
minimum - 416.9
Growth
(millions)
standard deviation
maximum
323.1
3494.6
mean 145.8
minimum - 32 3.9
Firms in Other Industries 232 firms
Debt
mean .498 standard deviation .207
minimum .062 maximum
Profit
1.341
(millions)
standard deviation 405.1
maximum 2891.6
mean 105.7
minimum - 87.4
Growth
(millions)
standard deviation
maximum
246.9
2086.4
TABLE 3
Cross-sectional Regression for Industry Effects
Predicted
Variable Coefficient Sign T-Ratio
M -0.13332E-02 - -0.1019
AT -0.64998E-01 - -0.9996
R -0.20355E-01 - -1.0109
Constant 0.88755E-01 + 7.9760
N=952
Adjusted R2 = -.0009
Legend
M = Manufacturing
AT = Air Transportation
R = Retail
TABLE 4
Cross-sectional Regression for Firm Characteristics
Predicted
Variable Coefficient Siqn T-Ratio
DEBT -0.14154 — -6.4414
GROWTH -0.43371E-01 - -2.2352
PROFIT 0.42074E-01 + 4.0641
Constant .14298 + 13.1650
Adjusted R2 = .0810
N=7 2
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